Writ Jurisdiction in the Shadow of SARFAESI: Reaffirming the Doctrine of Alternative Remedy and Tribunal Primacy

Sarvesh Kumar Tiwari, Advocate

A Case Comment on
M/s Waheguru Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Arora Auto Center & Ors.
(Special Appeal Nos. 420–424 of 2025, decided on 24 April 2026, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench)

Abstract

The Allahabad High Court at Lucknow in M/s Waheguru Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Arora Auto Center & Ors. reaffirms the limits of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the context of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The Court held that writ petitions are not maintainable when statutory remedies under Section 17 have already been invoked and are pending adjudication. The judgment also addresses the maintainability of writs against private financial institutions, the impermissibility of parallel proceedings, and the scope of interim relief in financial recovery disputes. This article analyses the decision considering established Supreme Court jurisprudence and evaluates its implications for banking and insolvency practice.

Keywords

SARFAESI, Writ Jurisdiction, Alternative Remedy, DRT, ARC, Interim Orders, Forum Shopping, Tenant Rights

1. Introduction

The relationship between constitutional remedies and statutory adjudicatory frameworks remains a contested area in Indian public law. While Article 226 of the Constitution confers wide powers upon High Courts, judicial discipline has evolved to restrain its exercise where efficacious alternative remedies exist. The SARFAESI Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”) establishes a specialized mechanism for adjudicating disputes arising from enforcement of security interests, primarily through the Debt Recovery Tribunal (“DRT”).

Despite this, litigants frequently invoke writ jurisdiction in parallel to statutory remedies. The present decision provides a decisive reaffirmation of the limits of such invocation, particularly where the statutory remedy has already been availed.

2. Factual Background

The dispute arose from SARFAESI proceedings initiated against a secured asset situated in Lucknow. Following default, the secured creditor and its assignees proceeded under the SARFAESI Act 2002, culminating in an auction sale and transfer of possession to the auction purchaser.

Simultaneously:

• The lessee (a public sector petroleum corporation) and its sub-lessee instituted multiple Securitization Applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the learned DRT. One such Securitization Application, filed by the licensee, came to be dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the licensee preferred an appeal before the DRAT, which is presently pending consideration. It is pertinent to note that the application for interim relief filed therein was also rejected, and the said order has not been assailed before any competent forum.


• During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, the lessee, i.e., BPCL, along with its licensee, invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing writ petitions seeking substantially identical reliefs, inter alia, for quashing of the SARFAESI proceedings and restoration of possession.


• The learned Single Judge, despite the preliminary objections raised with regard to the maintainability of the writ petitions, proceeded to entertain the same and further granted an interim order directing restoration of possession within 24 hours .

3. Issues for Determination

Being aggrieved by the aforesaid interim order, the Secured Creditor and the Auction Purchaser preferred an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench. The principal issue that arose for consideration before the Division Bench was as follows:

1. Whether writ petitions under Article 226 are maintainable when securitization proceedings under Section 17 SARFAESI are already pending.


2. Whether writ jurisdiction can be invoked against private financial institutions or Asset Reconstruction Companies (“ARCs”).

Bharat Petroleum Corporation
Writ C No. 11298 of 2025

3. Whether writ jurisdiction can be invoked against private financial institutions or Asset Reconstruction Companies (“ARCs”).


4. Whether factual disputes relating to tenancy and validity of proceedings can be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction.

4. Analysis of the Judgment

4.1 Alternative Remedy: A Bar Upon Invocation

The Court drew a critical distinction between:

• existence of an alternative remedy, and
• prior invocation of such remedy.

It held that where the remedy under Section 17 has already been invoked, a writ petition seeking similar relief is not maintainable. The Court emphasized that this is not merely a case of availability of remedy, but of actual invocation, thereby strengthening the bar against writ jurisdiction and also referred the judgments of co-ordinate bench

4.2 Parallel Proceedings and Abuse of Process

The Court deprecated the filing of multiple proceedings for identical reliefs, observing that the writ petitions were “substantially similar” to the securitization applications pending before the DRT.

Such parallel litigation was held to be an abuse of the judicial process, particularly where the same cause of action and reliefs were being pursued simultaneously before different for citing the judgement of Hon’ble Apex Court

4.3 Writs against Private Financial Institutions

The Court reaffirmed that ARCs and private financial institutions do not perform public functions merely by enforcing contractual and statutory rights under SARFAESI.

Special Appeal No.48 of 2026; 24 SPLA No. - 420 of 2025 S.B.I. Stressed Assets Recovery Branch and Another vs. M/s G.S.M. Bricks and Tiles and Others, dated 23.02.2026 and Writ C No.2119 of 2023; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Union of India and Others, dated 07.04.2023; Writ C No.12822 of 2025; M/S Education Academy and Others vs. District Magistrate District Sitapur and Others, dated 28.12.2025

Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority v. Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. reported in 1995 (1) SCC 642, 2010 11 SCC 622; Om Prakash Saini v. DCM Ltd.

Accordingly, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is not maintainable against such entities. This position is consistent with Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the private law character of such disputes.

4.4 Jurisdictional Discipline and Roster

A significant procedural issue addressed by the Court was the improper listing of the matter before a Single Judge. The Court held that:

• Jurisdiction cannot be determined by counsel’s endorsement; and
• Listing must strictly adhere to roster allocation by the Chief Justice.

The Court further directed the Registry to ensure compliance with jurisdictional norms irrespective of objections raised by counsel and also relied upon a judgement of co-ordinate bench .

4.5 Limits of Interim Relief

The Division Bench found that the Single Judge had effectively granted final relief at an interim stage by ordering restoration of possession.

Such an order was held to be impermissible as it:

• pre-empted statutory proceedings before the DRT; and
• interfered with completed SARFAESI actions including auction and possession.

The Court reiterated that interim relief must not defeat the legislative scheme or prejudice the rights of secured creditors.

4.6 Tribunal Primacy in Factual Adjudication

The Court emphasized that issues involving:

• validity of mortgage,
• proceedings against deceased persons, and
• tenancy or leasehold rights

require detailed factual adjudication and evidence. Such matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DRT under Section 17 and cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings.

5.Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir reported in (2022) 5 SCC 345
6.Special Appeal No.282 of 2025 (Lucknow Development Authority vs. Mohammad Zaimul Islam and Another)

4.7 Tenant Rights under SARFAESI

The Court indicated that the lease in favour of the petitioner had expired, and its status could at best be that of a “tenant in sufferance.”

It clarified that:

• rights of such tenants must be adjudicated under Section 17(4); and
• writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass this statutory mechanism.²⁵

5. Decision

The Division Bench:

• Allowed the special appeals;
• Quashed the interim order dated 28.11.2025; and
• Dismissed the writ petitions as not maintainable.

6. Critical Evaluation

The judgment advances three key doctrinal principles:

(i) Tribunal Primacy

By directing all disputes to the DRT, the Court reinforces the legislative intent underlying SARFAESI and prevents fragmentation of adjudication.

(ii) Judicial Restraint

The decision exemplifies restraint in the exercise of writ jurisdiction, particularly in commercial and financial matters involving statutory frameworks.

(iii) Procedural Discipline

The ruling discourages forum shopping and emphasizes adherence to jurisdictional norms and roster allocation.
While the judgment is doctrinally robust, it could have elaborated further on exceptions to the alternative remedy rule. However, given the facts, no such exception was convincingly established.

7. Conclusion

(2019) 9 SCC 94; Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal v. Central Bank of India and (1995) 5 SCC 698; R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P.

The decision represents a strong reaffirmation of the principle that writ jurisdiction is not a substitute for statutory remedies under SARFAESI. Once such remedies are invoked, parties must pursue them to their logical conclusion.


For practitioners, the judgment serves as a cautionary precedent: parallel invocation of writ jurisdiction in SARFAESI matters is likely to be rejected as an abuse of process.

Regards:-

Sarvesh Kumar Tiwari, Advocate
He also appeared as co-counsel for the appellants in Special Appeal No. 420 – 421 of 2025.